Introduction
At least since the later work of Michel Foucault, who explored the subject of free speech (παρρησία) in Plato's Gorgias in his penultimate lecture course in Collège de France, 3 one does not need to find a pretext to dwell on this topic. However, I do not want to make an impression that my argument follows Foucault's path. I will speak of certain 'scenes', which a reader can associate with each core participant of the dialogue. The term might seem artificial and deserves an explanation. Yet again, I don't want to lean here on Straussian concept of 'setting', which has a different meaning in his interpretations of Plato's dialogues 4 . This calls for an approach from a different angle, which has less to do with the history of Platonic scholarship, than with the actual political theory. Instead of a neutral term, such as 'sphere', I prefer to employ the term 'scene', and that has an obvious explanation. While Mill and Berlin speak of abstract individuals, Plato portrays familiar or even famous people with vivid and memorable characters. They do not merely occupy allotted places, but dramatically perform both in real life and in his dialogue. The rhetorical quality of the liberal argumentation notwithstanding, for Mill and Berlin the freedom of speech is one among several other fundamental rights of every human being. It is an inalienable possession of an individual, which a society should learn to keep its distance from. Switching back to the spatial metaphor, the liberal freedom of speech is a formally and even legally defined area within a clearly outlined space, the same for everybody. There is no performative perspective in this strictly geometrical vision. As we will see, this perspective is not alien to Plato's text, but it is not a predominant one within the dialogue. Likewise, we may first see a theatrical scene as a well-defined geometrical structure, but that all changes once actors appear on it. From that point on their acting defines the limits of this place. Unlike a theatrical performance a written dialogue is disposed of no actions, but only of words. This is why I will also speak of 'logical scenes'. If 3 the original logical scene in Plato's text starts changing, this effect can be produced solely through the transformative and liberating powers of speech itself.
The play that Plato shows us is a consecutive piece in four acts. One after another each of the main speakers comes forward and has his own moment to prove that his speech is absolutely free. Each speaker's abilities are tested against the structure of the original logical scene, where he first enters the conversation. Some speakers are willing to change the original scene, others are not. Some speakers see the connection between the power of the speech and one's ability to change the logical 'scene', others do not. But even among those who do (I will call them 'the realists'), not everybody is able to implement the transformation promised or desired. There are two realists in the dialogue and two unlikely 'logicians' (later I will justify the appropriateness of this term). Because the realists know the difference between the logical scenes, they understand as well that the freedom of speech is subject to change. Naturally they want to increase their abilities and to enjoy the freedom of speech to the fullest. They initiate the corresponding transitions between the scenes. In the end one of them fails, whereas another one succeeds. On the contrary, the two logicians do not want to change their original scenes; however, they provide two different reasons. One of them is confident that his speech is already free. There is no sense to move elsewhere. Another one does not believe that such a change is attainable for him given the unfavourable circumstances. Rather he hopes for a miracle.
Thus, Plato's four-part play exemplifies four clearly distinct positions in regards to freedom of speech. It is neither a mere gathering of famous rhetoricians, nor a simple game of survival where a random newcomer substitutes a failed predecessor as a conversational partner. The order of the appearance has a deep meaning: a realist, two logicians, and then another realist. So the first part poses a real-life political problem of free speech, which can be realistically solved in the final part only through a differentiation between two types of logical argumentation, introduced in the middle part of the dialogue. Already this composition demonstrates that the difference between rhetoric and philosophy has little to do with either the alleged 'mundaneness' of the former or the 'abstractness' of the latter. Being no less realistic and politically informed than rhetoric, philosophy is able to separate and use in turn two particular logics of argumentation, thus succeeding where rhetoric fails. Albeit I am speaking about logics, it does not imply that all philosophy can offer is an abstract solution to the political problem, posed by rhetoric. These two logics are political, not 'formal'. The arguments built upon them are incommensurable, but while they remain incomprehensible to each other, they are both familiar to everybody who has an experience of political life in a community. The two logics relate to two different political problems. The problem of freedom, that spurs the progress of the conversation, meets with the problem of justice that finds a more ostensible articulation in the dialogue. Philosophy holds a priority over rhetoric, only because philosophy is able to solve those two fundamental problems at once and on the spot. proper limits for his freedom of speech, his genuine 'scene'. They did not want to leave it anymore even though Socrates forced them to do so. Now I will briefly touch upon the four positions presented in the dialogue, focusing on the above mentioned features like 'scenes', political implications, and the logic behind the arguments.
The conversation between Socrates and Gorgias
The main interlocutor in the first part of the dialogue is Gorgias, the prominent rhetorician. He coined a phrase that serves as a slogan for the whole sophistic enterprise: 'Speech (λόγος) is a great potentate' (Encomium of Helen, 8) . For him freedom of speech is bound to the power of speech. However, in the dialogue he presents himself as a rhetorician, not a sophist. Socrates explains that sophistry relates to law-making, so as the oratory relates to legal proceedings. Lawmaking presupposes the full sovereign power, whereas in the courts two equal parties contend.
The standpoint of sophistry is the absolute domination, not struggle. But the historical sophists were usually some foreigners who frequented the great imperial city of Athens. They did not have the slightest political ground to behave here like lawmakers, all the evil suspicious of the Athenian demos notwithstanding. Demos hated sophists, but the art of rhetoric was a different case, because it was incorporated in the social routine like court hearings and political debates where the oratory was turned against itself, which made it less dangerous and extremely useful for the democracy. The conditions of oratory are a contest; therefore, it is subversive. The condition of sophistry is full power; therefore, it is sovereign. The free speech of Gorgias oscillates between those two possibilities. At the beginning of the dialogue he calls his 6 professional abilities with a modest name, the oratory, but at the same time he gives a dare to his audience, which reveals his true aspiration for the absolute logical domination; sophistry. It is Gorgias, who simultaneously bears and hides this contradiction within himself. The sole impact of Socrates is to make it visible.
Gorgias claims to be able to answer any question on anything anyone in the house cared to ask him (447c). Moreover, he hurries to seal his future triumph with a reminder that for many years he has never been faced with a question he hadn't met before (448a). On the one hand, Gorgias' pretension seems unlimited in regards both to his audience ('anything anyone') and to the timeframe. Therefore, his claim means that he enjoys the absolute freedom of speech. On the other hand, this unlimited pretension is qualified because the audience has been preselected ('anyone in the house'). Already the initial formulation of his claim contains a hidden contradiction. It is about the ultimate logical power that acts on a limited space. Gorgias' claim is supported though his professional expertise in rhetoric. 'For it is experience that enables our span of life to proceed according to art, whereas lack of experience leaves us at the mercy of chance'
The expert is master of his fate. Gorgias challenges the fate represented by random questions of random people gathered in Callicles' house. With his speech Gorgias is able to overcome any of them, which is not only mathematically improbable, it is simply unjust. But
justice is not what Gorgias promised to his audience; on the contrary, he is here to prove his excellence which is a rather undemocratic quality. Therefore, if justice ever enters his sovereign presentation, it happens only under compulsion as evidence that the initial plan failed.
Gorgias wants, but does not dare, to expand the sphere of influence for his rhetorical power.
After Socrates forced him to define it, he finally admits that rhetoric is the ability 'to persuade the jurors in the courts, the members of the Council, the citizens attending the Assembly, in short to win over any and every form of public meeting of the citizen body' (452e), in other words, to enslave everybody in Athens with speech. However, the undemocratic character of Gorgias' excellence becomes dangerous for him. In this 'scene' Gorgias does not run the risk to speak recklessly. Socrates is satisfied in discovering this hidden scene behind the ostentatious presentation. Now it is time for a real test of Gorgias' claim as the conversation touches the question of justice. Gorgias is compelled to admit that the province of rhetoric is right and wrong (454b). However, as mentioned above, he does not dare to go openly from his stand as reactive rhetorician to the position of absolute power, proper for both the sophist and the lawmaker.
Hence he does not dare to claim that he is able to educate the people about right and wrong, his only concern is to persuade them. But even in this cautious form his statement is venturesome. If an alien orator obtains the power to instil into the Athenian demos his ideas about right and 7 wrong, the demos is deprived of the sovereign notion of justice. It is nothing short of a coup d'état.
Socrates substitutes the original scene, where Gorgias is triumphant with the preselected audience in a private house, with the decisive scene, the sovereign demos in the political assembly, and lets Gorgias speak. Socrates stops interrupting him with questions and asks Gorgias --once again, but this time with a different scene --about the divine powers of rhetoric (456a). What follows is the climax of Part I of the conversation --a lengthy and completely free speech of Gorgias. Spared of any extraneous interference, Gorgias collapses in the middle of it.
As if suddenly realizing something, he abruptly moves in speech from a measureless glorification of rhetoric to a backup apology for it (456b-457с).
His clever manoeuvre proves his talents, as well as his realism. He is clearly able to make a distinction between the two different scenes, the original, artificial one and the decisive, natural one, and --being a realist --he knows for sure that in the end what he needs is a smart defence.
The harsh reality will destroy his success. Being a realist, Gorgias knows to appreciate a momentary distance from reality. Therefore, he refuses to go to where Socrates invites him, and abandons the conversation.
The conversation between Socrates and Polus
Polus, the next interlocutor of Socrates, does not understand what is happening. This means that he is no realist. For him there is no distinction between private and public spaces. Without reservation he resumes the conversation where it stopped, and in his turn raises claim that his speech is absolutely free and tries to prove it by inviting everybody to ask him any questions they want (462a). Socrates has a prompt explanation for why Polus is so confident. Free speech is tolerated and promoted under democracy; it is a law in the city (isēgoria). What Polus really says, is that everybody in Athens may answer any questions; he just happens to be more skilful than others. Hence Polus' claim is very different from Gorgias' one. The tactics Socrates successfully employed against Gorgias are of no use in the case of Polus. However, that does not mean that there is not some other scene to which Polus naturally belongs even if he does not realize it. The difficulty is only with its presentation, because it is not a real, but a logical one.
However, Socrates makes it almost visible by showing the hidden limits to which Polus' speech is confined. Of huge help here is not the city topography, but a different branch of knowledge.
Polus and Socrates converse as geometers (465b). Not everybody is able to use this language:
e.g., Callicles is not. Yet, it is the language of the majority, the 'normal people', the 'regular guys'. Polus may safely rely on the fact that almost everyone in the world would agree with him (475e). Some readers blame Plato for making Socrates supply superficial logical conclusions in this part of the dialogue. I think this is a misunderstanding. A certain degree of superficiality is inevitable, because the whole point is to demonstrate that Polus blindly follows the form at the expense of the content.
As an example I will cite only the final argument, which leaves Polus speechless (476a-481b).
Socrates begins with a very formal consideration, that 'in all cases the affected object is affected in a way which reflects the way in which the agent acts' (476c). Polus sees no immediate objection. However, by giving his consent he promptly loses the entire game, the progress of which is from now on secured by Socrates, who makes the best of it at his discretion. There is a quite obvious political implication of the initial consideration, which Polus perceives too late. In politics the agent is sovereign; the people that enact the laws. Through laws and courts, the political agent administers justice and affects the object, i.e. the individual. The logic of consistency forces one to conclude, that any action considered good by the agent may only be beneficial to the object. What is good for polis is good for its citizens, who after having committed a crime should willingly and eloquently beg the state for a salutary punishment. This 'extraordinary' conclusion stuns Polus, who cannot believe his ears, but has no objection to the argument, since the logic remains consistent (480e). He must accept this view as the formal consequence of the earlier conclusions. Remarkably, his last words are not denial, but consent.
Polus goes down by saying 'yes'.
Polus is the most underestimated character in the dialogue. Yet, in some respects he is the most important one. Gorgias is a celebrity, Callicles is an enigmatic rebel, but Polus is hardly known for more than a handbook of rhetoric which unfortunately was not spared by time. However, his elusiveness is not a mere lack of qualities, but a quality on its own. He is a regular person, but there is no more exotic tribe in Platonic dialogues, than 'normal people'. Being a regular person, Polus is not able to say anything incomprehensible or shocking to other regulars. What he means, is that speech of any regular person in a community which promotes free speech, is free by definition. This thesis may seem feeble, until we realize that it is exactly the point made by contemporary liberal theory. It is the negative definition of freedom, which is seamlessly tied with the possibility to outline a formal sphere of freedoms, the geometrically defined logical scene, within the political reality. Therefore, the negative concept of freedom is easily compatible with the task of establishing normative justice within community. One may point out that the first and the most valuable principle in John Rawls's theory of justice 8 presupposes the freedom of speech on the same terms, which are quite sufficient for Polus. The rationality of political agents in Rawls' theory means that they would be able to converse with Polus and
Socrates as geometers. Polus may admire dictators, but this flaw is correctible through regular and well defined procedures, because it is the characteristic of the community as whole and not of his particular mindset. Thus, despite being blind to the problem of positive freedom, Polus is a rewarding recipient of the normative justice. Also he is the touchstone for political liberalism.
Where Polus stops, this theory stops as well. It is silenced by the consideration that all normality is a derivative of system. The individual is betrayed by the same logic, which is employed to protect them. This is the starting point of Callicles's counter-attack.
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The conversation between Socrates and Callicles
There are five speakers in the dialogue (including Chaerephon, a companion of Socrates).
Naturally, Socrates is shown in conversation with everybody else. The same is true for Gorgias and even for Chaerephon, who hardly gets to put a word in. Interestingly, there is only one pair of participants who do not talk to each other, Polus and Callicles and it is as if they always needed a mediator. The mediatory part could be reserved for Chaerephon (see 447-448, 481b), but for my interpretation, it is essential that Polus and Callicles do not talk. It is not a coincidence, but a logical necessity --they do not talk, because they cannot. Despite that they are both Greek, they actually speak two different languages, which are based on two incommensurable logics, and therefore have nothing in common.
Callicles is the embodiment of transgression. He rushes to overcome all boundaries, norms and limits. The geometrical character of conversation between Polus and Socrates is unbearable for
him. Yet, Callicles and Socrates have also something special in common. They share an experience of being in an extraordinary and almost redundant love for two objects at the same time (ἐρῶντε, "both being in love", 481d). They both know the erotic language of exception, which is the opposite to the geometric language of norms. However, Callicles does not appreciate that Socrates is versatile in different ways of argumentation. For him it is not an advantage, but hypocrisy, because to him there is only one true language of free speech, which is his own, the shameless language of natural desires. The conventional norms are the fetters, which are used to enslave the most freedom-loving spirits in the political community (481b-486d). Individual freedom and democratic justice are in an inevitable conflict. It follows that the only way for a strong man to be free is to overthrow democracy and to become a tyrant, i.e. to do wrong.
Callicles easily escapes from the logical labyrinth which trapped Polus, because he feels no embarrassment in expressing unconventional views and never puts consistency over the truth.
Socrates hopes to finally meet a person who openly speaks his mind, who is παρρησιαστής, an 'outspoken person' (487d). It implies that there may be no logical scene to impose limits on Callicles' free speech. Obviously, the scenes discovered while examining Gorgias' and Polus' claims do not count. Callicles is an Athenian citizen; moreover, he is a demagogue, a speaker who knows to lead the audience in the political assembly. Neither the public, nor a private space discomforts him. Keeping in mind his inclination for exceptions, it is appropriate to conclude that he is able to escape any such scene.
Nevertheless, Socrates succeeds in showing that Callicles fails. How is that even possible?
Callicles' language is not a geometrical, i.e. it may not be 'depicted', even logically, in the way
Socrates did with Polus. What is not depicted cannot be demonstrated. This line of thought might seem like a metaphor, yet it is a strict logic, only not of the kind we learn at school. Albeit we do not know whether Callicles was a real person, his approach was highly appreciated by such prominent figure in 'continental' philosophy as Gilles Deleuze, who practically identified Callicles and Nietzsche. 9 Deleuze blames Plato for using Socrates as a dialectical tool to silence Callicles and those like him. The French philosopher sees no point in a deeper examination of Socrates' position, for he is confident that Callicles' logic is impeccable. A logical truth of this kind needs no further examination.
The problem with Callicles' position is that his aspiration for individuality is undermined by his preference for the most common pleasures (492a-c). He presents himself as possessing an extraordinary nature and, yet, he wants to satisfy any desire indiscriminately. Where does he obtain the 'list' of pleasures to enjoy? His source is the same as that of Polus, --the common opinion. The vulgar basis of his desires contradicts to his non-egalitarian elitism. Callicles is not initiated in the mysteries of the true artistic freedom, which is utterly discriminative (493a). Still, a formal contradiction is not an objection, per se, against the logic of exceptionality, which Callicles employs. Remarkably, it is not a contradiction, but a hidden consistency behind the pretended independency of free speech that ultimately leads to Callicles' withdrawal from the conversation. Callicles boasts that he is faithful only to himself, but he is not able to present anything of his own. Too easily he compensates the void with a mere negation of conventions.
However, that may only mean that Callicles' pretended individuality depends on them absolutely. It is no wonder that he eventually admits that he has no other choice than to please the same demos which he secretly hates.
Indeed, the two seemingly opposite characters, Callicles and Polus, have much in common. They share the key scene, the same logical labyrinth. The only difference is that Polus is trapped inside, while Callicles is trapped outside. But Callicles can get away from this position no more than Polus can. They are both 'logicians', since they both rely on a specific logic of argumentation, rather than take into account the real-life political incompatibility between freedom and justice. While Polus is blind towards the problem of freedom, Callicles ignores the problem of justice. By way of inversion, it may mean that the geometrical logic of norms, shared by Polus and Socrates, is the foundation of every account of justice possible, while the erotic logic of exception, shared by Callicles and Socrates, is the ultimate source of any positive account of free speech. But this general question of political philosophy reaches beyond the scope of my presentation.
I cannot help but conclude my interpretation of Callicles' position by going back to the question of whether the place of main conversation is in his private house. The negative answer 12 (championed by Dodds) does not harm the core of my interpretation but his argument does not convince me at all. Moreover, I believe that it makes every sense that the answer is positive. For that, one can give not only text-related considerations, but also a more substantial reason, which highlights the importance of this particular fact for understanding the dialogue. Callicles, in short, says that one should do wrong and commit injustice, unless one is a slave by nature. The pure logical character of his view is best shown by the reality-related fact under consideration.
Callicles is and will be the master of his household, even if he does not do wrong. Callicles completely ignores the real scene, where he stands, in favour of the logical scene, where his argument works most persuasively. Instead of becoming a tyrant in the real life he proves to be a slave to logic.
The conversation of Socrates with himself
With all of his opponents having failed, the rest of the dialogue belongs to Socrates. His sovereign speech is characterized through two crucial features: it is free and, being free, it is just.
Socrates wins, but he deserves his success only because he is able to show that there is no real incompatibility between freedom and justice. Being a realist, like Gorgias, Socrates clearly sees a variety of scenes through which people move in their lives. Some of them test one's freedom, others test one's justice. Dealing with it, a rhetorician can employ two types of discourses. First he may boast of his rhetorical power over ordinary folks, then he can persuasively justify himself by pointing out the inevitable limits of his impact. He fails only when it comes to a decisive scene, where it is indispensable to be both at once. By having exposed that scene, Socrates shows Gorgias' weakness. In turn, another rhetorician, Callicles, warns Socrates that his philosophical attitude would be fatal in court (521c). Yet, neither a political assembly, nor a court hearing counts as a particularly decisive scene for Socrates. Formally, his fate was indeed determined under such circumstances, and every reader of Plato is supposed to know that. However, as both
Gorgias and Apology of Socrates make us believe, it was Socrates himself rather than the Athenian demos, who sealed his fate. For him, 'excellence and goodness do not consist merely in the preservation of life' (512d). Socrates drops the explicitly political scenes out of consideration, but far from becoming another 'logician', he claims to be 'the only genuine practitioner of politics in Athens' (521d). When he advances his paradoxical thesis on justice, that doing wrong is worse than suffering wrong, it is not simply a moral radicalism, wishful thinking, or fanaticism, detached from this world (521c). Socrates' life is a constant source of moral inspiration, but besides the model life path to follow, the Platonic Socrates actually presents in Gorgias a highly important philosophical argument, which often goes unnoticed.
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It is particularly difficult to appreciate the real merit of this line of thought for our generation of 14 Socrates reproached Callicles for neglecting geometry. Clearly he meant that the geometrical language of justice is unknown to his interlocutor. As an example of the unusual geometrical equality, Socrates describes the cooperative structure of the cosmos where 'love, order, discipline, and justice bind heaven and earth, gods and men'. This ultimate scene, the entire cosmos, is the place of justice and freedom for every kind of inhabitant because the two logics, love and justice, inequality and equality, are made compatible in it. The scene has a clear parallel in Martin Heidegger's notion of 'the fourfold' ('das Geviert') from his lecture The Thing. This short and enigmatic piece pretends to be as apolitical as possible. It radiates confidence and calmness, especially in its final section, where the author does not need to criticize the concept of objectivity of things adopted in the contemporary science anymore. Yet, after establishing the absolute sovereignty of his speech, Heidegger uses it exactly as Plato's Socrates in Gorgias.
Heidegger describes the world as the unity of the fourfold: 'earth and sky, divinities and mortals'. In that, the utterly complex relations within the fourfold unity preserve the unmistakable traces of its genealogical relation to the issues of freedom and justice 11 .
In Gorgias, Socrates presents the principle scheme for the solution of the main political problem which philosophy can offer. The solution itself is reserved for another of Plato's masterpiece, the Republic. Whereas Gorgias is an examination into the conditions of free speech, the Republic (II-X) is the sovereign speech itself, which, as Gorgias teaches us, can be nothing other than a discourse on justice.
Conclusion
In the final remarks I will put the key elements of my interpretation into the meta-philosophical perspective, which is becoming more and more accessible on the brink of the new millennium. I used the term 'scene' as an obvious metaphor, which was useful in keeping my interpretation open to a reader with limited expertize in contemporary philosophy. Yet, at some point the metaphorical usage must make way for an uncompromising philosophical approach. There are several reasons for it, and not the least among them is that we cannot ignore the implications of philosophically looking for metaphors, which has established itself as a profession on its own since Friedrich Nietzsche. But the more exciting opportunity is the chance to gain a vision for the sense of philosophy from Plato's text, which seems to have been lost towards the end of 20 th century amidst the chronic institutional opposition between the analytical and the continental traditions.
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Even such philosophers as Richard Rorty, who managed to stay loyal to both parties, obviously did not see much value in philosophy, giving democracy a priority over it.
12 Surprisingly, his verdict of philosophy is similar to that of Callicles. Therefore, it is significant to underline that according to Plato's Gorgias the solution to the real problem, exemplified by political experience, is attainable only through philosophy, which is presented as highly critical and provocative thinking and not as a respectable, but rigid moralization. The philosophical underrating of Plato's Gorgias, as well as others dialogues including the Republic, remained hidden throughout the majority of the last century. The reason for that is remarkable.
The structural peculiarities of this dialogue and of contemporary philosophy mirror each other, Philosophically it means that Socrates is able to use both the logics, but unlike a rhetorician like Gorgias, who is careful enough in choosing only one type of argumentation on each occasion, the philosopher is able to use them both everywhere and anytime. In our circumstances this would mean a person, who is an expert in both the contemporary philosophical traditions.
However, that is not all, because as the history of philosophy teaches us, this is rather impossible. The last century was the period of logical antagonism. So one has to choose a school of thought to belong to, otherwise one is doomed to be confronted with internal and external conflicts.
